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Abstract
We study whether commonality of incentives and oppor-
tunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from
culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of
30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that
banks’ reputations suffered substantial damage upon the
announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also
document reputational contagion spread from banks that
manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incen-
tives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational
contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers
who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Reputation plays an important role in modern corporate life as a quality-assuring device (Klein & Leffler, 1981), and
the growing integration of the international financial market has created multiple channels for the transmission of
shocks. This paper addresses the reputational penalties that banks received for involvement in the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal and the contagion effect on other banks in the LIBOR and connected panels (“LIBOR
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banks” hereafter). Extant literature on the spillover effect of through-interorganizational networks, particularly direc-
tor interlocks, where the directors of firms sit on each other’s boards (Kang, 2008), and through the mechanism of
generalization by which reputational penalties spill over to other firms (Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009).
This paper examines the mechanisms through which contagion can be channeled and reputational penalties can
spill over from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Specifically, we argue that reputational penalties spread from the
firm accused of misconduct to other firms that share with it the same incentive and opportunity to commit the fraud.
Rationalization, the incentive to commit a fraud, and the opportunity to do so are the three elements of the so-called
“fraud triangle” developedbyCressey (1973) andusedbyCertifiedPublicAccountants (CPAs)who seek tounderstand
andmanage fraud risk. Commonality of incentives and the opportunity to commit a fraudulent act represent a channel
through which generalization and contagion can spread from one firm to other nonaffiliated firms and is the channel
investigated in this paper.
The recent high-profile LIBOR scandal that centered on Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), UBS, and a num-
ber of other leading global banks has drawn considerable attention. While the damage from the scandal is still being
calculated, the LIBOR scandal’s setting offers the opportunity to appraise the penalties imposed by the markets and
the degree to which bank misconduct can affect other banks. Specifically, the contemporaneous presence of banks
accused of LIBOR manipulation and nonaccused banks that sit on the LIBOR panel provides us with a research set-
ting that allows us to test whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to misbehave trigger reputational
contagion.
We analyze the security returns of banks that are involved in LIBOR rigging during the period from March 2011
to December 2013 and identify 39 event dates on which banks are accused of or sanctioned for manipulating LIBOR.
Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the LIBOR and a control sample of 30 banks, we find substantial
reputational damage,measured by the banks’ stock returns in a 3-daywindowaround the event (i.e., [–1,+1]).We also
document a contagion effect of the reputational damage that is passed from banks accused of LIBOR manipulation
to nonaccused banks that share the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraudulent act. We also show
that the contagion effect is significantly stronger among banks that are large derivatives dealers who have had the
strongest incentives to misbehave. Even when they were not accused of misconduct, they had experienced stronger
repulational penalties.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. The LIBOR scandal is in effect an operational risk event
that affected multiple banks (McConnell, 2013). Our paper pertains to the literature considering impacts of opera-
tional risk events on bank reputation measured by stock returns (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Fiordelisi, Soana &
Schwizer, 2014; Gillet, Hubner, & Plunus, 2010; Perry & de Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sturm, 2013). Our first contribution
is methodological. While most event studies focus on accused firms, we distinguish between nonaccused banks that
couldmanipulate LIBORand those that could not. This unique feature of our setting allows us to investigate the conta-
gion effect in a novel and unexplored perspective. Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the LIBOR scan-
dal. Extant literature on the LIBOR scandal focuses on submission banks’ reporting behavior of the LIBOR rates during
the crisis period (Monticini & Thornton, 2013), and incentives for manipulating LIBOR (Gandhi, Golez, Jackwerth, &
Plazzi, 2019; Snider & Youle, 2014; Vaughan & Finch, 2017). Our paper complements these studies by showing how
markets react to the disclosure of banks’ fraudulent act and distinguishing banks with stronger incentives to manipu-
late the LIBOR from thosewithweaker incentives. Third, our paper contributes to the literature on bank contagion by
documenting a new channel, represented by commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud, through
which contagion is channeled from culpable firms to nonculpable firms.
Findings in this paper on the reputational effect and contagion effect of the LIBOR scandal could also be of interest
to policy makers. The breadth of the contagion effect in the international banking system shown in this paper rein-
forces the importance of cross-country banking supervision and risk management.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of LIBOR and the LIBOR scan-
dal. Section 3 reviews the related literature and develops the research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and
methodology. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 LIBOR AND THE LIBOR SCANDAL
LIBOR is a set of rates first published under the auspices of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) in 1986 that repre-
sent the cost of short-term wholesale funds for major banks in the London interbank market. Prior to the transfer of
responsibility for administration of LIBOR fromBBA to the Intercontinental ExchangeBenchmarkAdministration Ltd.
(ICE) on January31, 2014, LIBORwas calculatedandpublishedeachbusinessdaybyThomsonReuters, towhommajor
banks submit their cost of borrowing unsecured funds in 10 currencies1 for 15 maturities,2 so 150 LIBOR rates are
reported daily. For each currency, there is a panel consisting of contributing banks. The submission process requires
contributing banks to evaluate the rates atwhichmoneymay be available in the interbankmarket. Contributing banks
are required to provide a submission based on that particular banks’ cost of borrowing unsecured cash for specific
currencies and maturities by responding to the following question: “At what rate could you borrow funds, were you
to do so by asking for and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 a.m.?”3 Thom-
son Reuters trims the rates by removing the top and bottom 25% and then averages the remainder to create the final
LIBOR rates, which are published and available to the world around midday London time. This mechanism has a num-
ber of shortcomings since it is hypothetical, subjective, and open to abuse when an unethical person submits a rate
(McConnell, 2013), so it is ineffective in preventing manipulation.
On June 27, 2012, Barclays admitted to misconduct related to manipulating the daily setting of the LIBOR and
the Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR4) and agreed to a US$453 million fine settlement with the U.K. Financial
Services Authority (FSA), the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice (DoJ). According to the DoJ, certain Barclays swap traders requested that certain Barclays LIBOR and EURIBOR
submitters submit LIBOR and EURIBOR contributions that would benefit the traders’ trading positions on numerous
occasions between 2005 and 2009. Barclays admitted to three types of manipulation: underreporting, overreport-
ing, and holding constant. The motives behind the three types of misrepresentations varied over time, from benefit-
ing derivatives trading positions to appearing more financially sound especially during distressed times (Gandhi et al.,
2019;Monticini & Thornton, 2013).
Evidence from the regulators’ probe confirmed that the manipulation of LIBOR was not a localized event but part
of business-as-usual in the global financial markets, a blatantly unethical and occasionally illegal practice that deliber-
ately and systematicallymanipulated borrowing rates.One of the key issues reflected through this case is the inherent
conflict of interest within the banks in question. Traders made requests to both the internal submitter at the bank and
external submitters at third-party banks to influence the LIBOR submissions according to their own trading positions
in derivatives and themoneymarkets.5
3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Reputational penalties for corporate misconduct
Prior market-based research into corporate misconduct finds substantial losses in the market value of firms that are
implicated inmisconduct,which suggests reputational effects as an important device in disciplining firms. The strength
1 AUD, CAD, CHF, DKK, EUR, GBP, JPY, NZD, SEK, and USD.
2 Overnight, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months, 4 months, 5 months, 6 months, 7 months, 8 months, 9 months, 10 months, 11 months, and
12months.
3 TheWheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report.
4 EURIBOR is a reference rate overseen by the European Banking Federation. The EURIBOR contributor panel consisted of approximately 42 to 48 banks.
Thomson Reuters also acts as an agent for calculation and publishing of this rate. The administration process of this rate is highly similar to the one of LIBOR.
However, only the highest and lowest 15% of all quotes are trimmed in EURIBOR calculation.
5 In the matter of: The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC and RBS Securities Japan Limited. U.S. CFTC. February 6, 2013.
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of reputational penalties has been examined in a number of different settings, and most of these studies document
negative abnormal returns in the selected event period (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Karpoff, Lee, &Martin,
2008).
Although the literature affirms the role of reputation as a disciplinary mechanism for corporate misconduct, Mur-
phy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2009) argue that studies have not provided definitive evidence that links allegation-related
wealth losses to changes in financial performance. Instead, they find decreased earnings and increased risk as the
explanation for the allegation-related effects on wealth and reputation. Among the types of misconduct (i.e., antitrust
violations, bribery, copyright violations, and fraud) that have been studied, fraud has the largest negative effect on
firms’ market value. In studying the types of corporate misconduct, Karpoff, Lott, andWehrly (2005) find that market
reaction to violations of environmental regulations is not, on average, larger than the legal penalties imposed, so losses
in share value are attributed to prospective legal sanctions rather than to reputational costs. Perry and de Fontnou-
velle (2005) assess corporations’ stock price reactions to announcements of major operational loss events and find a
reputational loss when a firm’s market value declines bymore than the announced amount of loss.
Focusing on operational losses by banks and insurance companies, Cummins et al. (2006) obtain results that are
consistent with Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005). Sturm (2013) analyzes reputational damage caused by opera-
tional losses in European financial firms and contends that the negative stock market reaction is more pronounced in
response to announcements of settlement than it is to the initial indications of the loss, and that reputational damage
is more pronounced for banks that are highly leveraged. Gillet et al. (2010) analyze market reactions to announce-
ments of operational loss announcements by financial firms listed in Europe and the United States. Compared to the
U.S. firms, European companies usually suffer frommore reputational damage. Fiordelisi et al. (2014) suggest that rep-
utational losses in the financial industry are higher in Europe than in North America, while Armour, Mayer, and Polo
(2017) analyze the reputational losses sustained by financial firms that are penalized by the regulator in the United
Kingdom and find that reputational penalties average nine times the size of the financial penalties. They also note that
the size of the penalties leveled in the United Kingdom does not necessarily reflect the seriousness of thewrongdoing
as perceived by investors and clients; instead, the disclosure of misconduct itself is the primary source of the reputa-
tional damage.
Our first research question is whether the market penalizes banks for accusations of LIBOR manipulation. Repu-
tational penalties in financial markets are an ethical mechanism that internalizes the cost of corporate misconduct in
terms of repeated business transactions (Engelen& van Essen, 2011).We suggest that the stock price (i.e., the present
valueof future cash flows) around theannouncementdate is a final price generated through themechanismofmultiple
underlying channels throughwhich stakeholders, including customers and clients, employees, suppliers, debt holders,
and equity holders, penalize the bank for alleged LIBORmanipulation.We expect that, following an announcement of
involvement in the LIBOR scandal, banks would experience reputational penalties imposed by the market, measured
by a drop in share value. Therefore, we posit our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: Themarket penalizes banks in the formof reputational damage upon the announcement of alleged LIBORmanip-
ulation.
3.2 Bank contagion
Extant literature on bank contagion focuses on whether bad news from one bank or a group of banks, such as news
about bank failures and financial distress, adversely affects other banks. Aharony and Swary (1983) document a con-
tagion effect in three largest bank failures in the United States but contend that the observed drop in the valuation of
solvent banks arises from investors’ response to a negative signal instead of a contagion effect. Schoenmaker (1996)
employs a larger sample of bank failures and confirms the presence of contagion risk in banking. Docking, Hirschey,
and Jones (1997) document a significant negative contagion effect of bank loan-loss announcements. Bessler and
Nohel (2000) study the contagion effect of dividend reductions byU.S. banks and document a contagion effect in both
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nonannouncingmoney-center banks and big regional banks. Brewer and Jackson (2002) test for a contagion effect fol-
lowing announcements of financial distress byU.S. commercial banks and life insurance companies, and argue that the
documented interindustry effects on shareholder wealth are not purely contagious in nature but are also attributable
to factors like the composition of portfolios, geographic proximity, leverage, and regulatory expectations.
Overall, extant literature on the spillover effect of reputational penalties has proposed three main mechanisms
through which contagionmight occur: (1) economic or exchange ties between firms, (2) interorganizational networks,
and (3) generalization. The first mechanism is the most frequently investigated in the literature. Beatty, Bunsis, and
Hand (1998) show that SEC investigations of underwriters impose a variety of measurable and significant indirect
penalties on their clients, particularly Initial Public Offering (IPO) clients. The reputation of an underwriter and its
clients is positively related, and the deterioration of the reputation of the former inevitably affects the later (Beatty
et al., 1998). Chaney and Philipich (2002) focus on the Enron audit failure and document that themarket imposed rep-
utation penalties to the other clients of the Enron’s auditor. Akhigbe,Madura, andMartin (2005) also employ Enron as
the research setting and show that adverse news releases about one firm have contagion effects for connected firms,
such as suppliers, trading counterparties, and creditors. Jensen (2006) investigates what affected Andersen clients’
defection, and shows that accountability-induced status anxiety influenced defections by Andersen’s publicly traded
clients. Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) investigate the contagion effects of accounting restatements and find
that investors impose penalties on the restating company’s peers. The contagion effect also spreads to companies that
use the same external auditor as the restating firm. Bonini and Boraschi (2010) focus on security class-action suits and
show that a corporate scandal affects the security issuance and stock price of industry peers. These studies document
a negative spillover effect that moves from one company to other organizations that share with it some form of eco-
nomic or exchange ties, such as clients, suppliers, and industry peers. Kang (2008) examines the second mechanism
that can channel contagion: the presence of interorganizational networks. Specifically, Kang (2008) documents a con-
tagion effect of financial reporting fraud from accused to associated firms through director interlocks. Finally, Jonsson
et al. (2009) introduce generalization as a thirdmechanism. Jonsson et al. (2009, p. 195) claim that “individuals observe
a single act of deviance, interpret it as potentially harmful or contrary to social norms, and proceed to incorporate the
possibility of such events into their general knowledge about organizations.” They provide evidence that there are
three ways through which generalization can be channeled and reputational penalties can be imposed on nonaffili-
ated firms: through a shared organizational form,6 across organizational formswith similar characteristics, and across
organizations with characteristics made salient by fraudulent act. Caiazza, Cotugno, Fiordelisi, and Stefanelli (2018)
study the effects of sanctions on sanctioned banks and document a spillover effect on nonsanctioned banks that have
features similar to those of sanctioned banks.
Our second hypothesis focuses on the mechanisms through which contagion can be channeled. Indeed, as previ-
ously described, there is plenty of research documenting the presence of contagion among firms, but the underlying
mechanisms are still largely unexplored. Specifically, we focus on firms that have the same opportunity and incentive
to commit a fraud, and we argue that contagion can spread from the accused firm to organizations that share with
it the same opportunity and incentive to misbehave. As mentioned earlier, rationalization, the incentive to commit a
fraud, and the opportunity to do it are the elements of the so-called “fraud triangle” developed by Cressey (1973). This
three-pronged framework suggests that fraud is more likely to occur when there is an incentive to commit the fraud,
when weak controls or oversight provide an individual or organization with the opportunity to commit the fraud, and
when theperpetrator can rationalize the fraudulent behavior.Wehypothesize thatwhenoneLIBORbank is accusedof
manipulation, the reputational penalties spill over toother, nonaccusedLIBORbanks since they sharewith theaccused
bank the incentive and the opportunity to commit the fraud. Therefore, we posit the following:
H2: The reputational damage sufferedbybanks accusedof LIBORmanipulationhas a contagioneffect onother banks
that share the same incentive and opportunity to commit the fraud.
6 Organizational forms are defined as organizations that share industry and operational blueprints (Jonsson et al., 2009).
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TABLE 1 Balancing property of thematching covariates
Variable LIBOR Control Difference p value
SIZE 13.972 10.315 3.657 0.000
CIR 62.986 79.197 −16.211 0.111
DETA 19.845 1.091 18.754 0.000
LTA 37.212 54.214 −17.002 0.001
Note. This table reports balancing property of the covariates included in propensity score matching to identify control (non-
LIBOR) banks.
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
We construct a database for a sample of banks that were accused of manipulating the LIBOR between June 2012
and December 2013.7 We hand-collected news on the LIBOR scandal from four major news providers: BBC News,
Bloomberg, The Financial Times, and TheWall Street Journal. We chose this set of news providers for the following rea-
sons: First, the LIBOR scandal was discovered and published in the United Kingdom, and BBCNews provided full cov-
erageof the relatednews in a sectiondedicated to theupdates on this scandal. Second, the other threenewsproviders,
Bloomberg,TheFinancial Times, andTheWall Street Journal, are highly specialized in global coverageof financial news. In
addition, TheWall Street Journalwas among the first to raise questions about whether global banks weremanipulating
the process by “low-balling” a key interest rate to avoid looking desperate in themidst of the financial crisis.8
We identify 39 event dates when information regarding the LIBOR investigation was disclosed. For stale news,
such as news about market anticipation and news provided by insiders who were familiar with the situation prior to
the fine settlement date,we take the earliest available date. Detailed descriptions of each event dates used in our anal-
ysis are included in theAppendix in Supporting Information S1.We retrievemarket data around the event dates for all
banks that belonged to any of three panels: (1) the LIBORpanel, which contains all contributor banks for all currencies;
(2) global systemically important banks (G-SIBs);9 and (3) G14, the 14 largest derivatives dealers that collectively
account for more than 80% of all outstanding interest rate derivatives. As shown in the Appendix in Supporting Infor-
mation S2, most of the contributor banks are G-SIBs. That is, LIBOR contributor banks are large and systemically
important. On the other hand, all of the 14 largest derivatives dealer banks are LIBOR contributor banks, indicat-
ing an incentive behind the rate manipulation. Some banks, such as Barclays, Citigroup, and UBS, are members of all
the three panels while some banks sit on one or two of the three panels. In fact, the combination of information in the
Appendices in Supporting Information S1 and S2 show a tendency toward a positive correlation between the number
of panels of which a bank is a member and the level of its involvement in the LIBOR scandal. We also pooled the three
panels into one set, named “LIBOR banks,” as presented in the Appendix in Supporting Information S2. Some of the
LIBORbankswere involved in the LIBOR scandalwhile otherswere not accused ofmisconduct. Nonetheless, all banks
that sit on any of the three panels had the incentive and the opportunity to be involved in the LIBOR manipulation,
7 Our sample period starts in June 2012 because, as discussed in Section 2, on June 27, 2012, the scandal was materialized (i.e., regulatory fine) for the
first time.
8 Study casts doubt on key rate. TheWall Street Journal, May 29, 2008.
9 In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published an integrated set of policy measures to address the systemic and moral-hazard risks con-
nected with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In that publication, the FSB identified an initial group of G-SIFIs, namely, 29 G-SIBs, using
a methodology developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The group of G-SIFIs is updated annually based on new data. Since the
November 2012 update, the G-SIBs have been allocated to buckets corresponding to the higher loss-absorbency requirements that they would be required
to hold. G-SIBs are subject to requirements for group-wide resolution planning and regular resolvability assessments. G-SIBs are also subject to higher super-
visory expectations for risk-management functions, risk data aggregation capabilities, risk governance, and internal controls.
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max
R 3,448 0.002 0.017 −0.007 0.001 0.009 −0.155 0.103
Rf 3,448 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.007
ER 3,448 −0.011 1.670 −0.906 −0.083 0.729 −15.878 9.893
EVENT 3,448 0.055 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
NONEVENT 3,448 0.253 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
NONLIBOR 3,448 0.548 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
SIZE 3,448 12.165 2.083 10.082 12.313 14.331 7.920 14.806
DETA 3,448 11.362 20.116 0.000 2.513 12.604 0.000 78.481
LTA 3,448 44.452 20.419 30.175 43.628 60.885 0.000 79.082
ADJFINE 3,448 0.002 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.650
LTB 3,448 −0.018 0.382 −0.250 −0.008 0.197 −2.299 2.546
MKT 3,448 0.118 1.304 −0.748 0.015 0.674 −4.501 8.359
REIT 3,448 0.000 0.008 −0.004 0.001 0.005 −0.038 0.050
CORP 3,448 0.131 0.305 −0.016 0.097 0.293 −0.686 1.167
HY 3,448 0.062 0.353 −0.142 0.010 0.303 −0.696 1.224
FOREX 3,448 0.000 0.003 −0.002 0.000 0.002 −0.018 0.013
SOV 3,448 −3.510 11.963 −8.518 −2.133 4.313 −44.665 22.280
COM 3,448 0.098 0.894 −0.385 0.176 0.511 −2.418 3.449
PLT 3,448 −0.137 0.959 −0.661 −0.029 0.365 −2.270 4.958
Note. This table presents descriptive statistics for 3,448 observations. The sample period is from June 26, 2012 to December
4, 2013. N refers to the number of observations, SD is the standard deviation, P25 and P75 are the 25th and 75th percentile,
while Min and Max refer to the minimum and maximum values. ER is multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. All variables
are defined in the Appendix.
given that they were highly interconnected: more than half of interest rate swap trades are between financial insti-
tutions rather than between a bank and a customer, and even this trading is concentrated in a small number of large
banks (Fleming, Jackson, Li, Sarkar, & Zobel, 2012).
We use this sample of LIBOR banks to test whether (i) the market punished LIBOR banks involved in the LIBOR
scandal and (ii) nonaccused LIBORbanks received reputational penalties because they sharedwith the culpable banks
the same incentives and opportunity to misbehave. We refer to the former effect as a reputational effect and to the
latter effect as a contagion effect.
Following Kaufman (1994), Docking et al. (1997), and Groppa and Moerman (2004), we use a working definition
of contagion as negative stock returns experienced by banks that arise from the disclosure of misconduct by another
bank or group of banks.Our definition of financial contagion is close to the spirit of Lang and Stulz (1992) andKaufman
(1994) who regard negative information externalities (spillovers) as contagion.
4.2 Methodology
Our identification strategy relies on comparingmarket returns around the event dates for LIBORbanks (both accused
banks and nonaccused banks) and a control group of banks that were external to any LIBOR banks. Therefore, banks
in the control group were neither involved in the scandal nor had the incentives and opportunity to misbehave since
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TABLE 4 Reputational penalties and the contagion effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
EVENT −0.191** −0.190** −0.187** −0.187**
[−2.211] [−2.308] [−2.163] [−2.251]
NONEVENT −0.193** −0.199** −0.180** −0.187**
[−2.260] [−2.330] [−2.160] [−2.239]
NONLIBOR −0.102 −0.115 −0.092 −0.106
[−1.082] [−1.207] [−1.000] [−1.136]
SIZE 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000
[0.163] [0.003] [0.187] [0.022]
DETA −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
[−0.537] [−0.693] [−0.541] [−0.696]
LTA −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003***
[−2.858] [−2.882] [−2.801] [−2.824]
ADJFINE 0.266 0.346 0.254 0.334
[0.706] [0.916] [0.663] [0.870]
LTB −0.023 −0.023 0.044 0.042
[−0.449] [−0.444] [0.813] [0.775]
MKT 0.988*** 0.987*** 0.975*** 0.973***
[24.532] [24.517] [30.699] [30.767]
REIT −2.307 −1.899
[−0.743] [−0.604]
CORP −0.300*** −0.302***
[−3.215] [−3.247]
HY −0.119* −0.120*
[−1.872] [−1.893]
FOREX −12.397** −12.458**
[−2.123] [−2.124]
SOV −0.006** −0.006**
[−2.518] [−2.551]
COM 0.087*** 0.088***
[3.292] [3.305]
PLT −0.007 −0.006
[−0.334] [−0.326]
Constant −0.031 0.143 −0.028 0.149
[−0.135] [0.617] [−0.120] [0.647]
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country×Year No Yes No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
(Continues)
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
N 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448
R2 0.593 0.593 0.596 0.597
Note. This table reports test results for Hypothesis 1 under different specifications: reduced formmultifactor model (1 and 2)
and extended formmultifactor model (3 and 4). Country and year fixed effects are included in (1) and (3) while country×year
fixed effects are included in (2) and (4). Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. All variables are
defined in the Appendix.
they were not included in any LIBOR panels. Our two research hypotheses predict a negative and significant market
reaction around event dates for accused and nonaccused LIBOR banks and an insignificant market reaction around
event dates for non-LIBOR banks.
Themeasurement of reputational penalties in the literature is largely based on the assumption that stock price rep-
resents investors’ expectations concerning the value of the company based on the mechanism of supply and demand,
which consists of multiple channels through which stakeholders impose reputational penalties on the company. In
this mechanism, reputational penalties imposed by stakeholders are incorporated in a drop in stock price upon the
announcement of corporatemisconduct. However, reputational penalties aremeasured in varyingways, amongwhich
is to take the residual in market value loss after deducting the amount of either legal sanctions or the announced loss.
Some studies, such as Murphy et al. (2009), consider the sum of the loss in market value, drop in earnings, and the
rise to reflect the reputational penalty. We adopt the multifactor model from Bessler and Kurmann (2014), in which
bank-specific excess returns are regressedon a set of common risk factors, andonevent-relateddummyvariables. The
event-related dummy variables provide for mean shifts in returns on event days. Model 1 uses a 3-day event window
to test for the reputational effect (H1) for each of the events listed in the Appendix in Supporting Information S1.
ERi,t = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1EVENTi,t + 𝛼2NONEVENTi,t
+ 𝛼3NONLIBORi,t + 𝛼4ADJFINEi,t
+ BANK CONTROLSi,t−1 + COMMON RISKt + 𝜀, (1)
where ER is the daily excess stock return for an individual bank, which is the difference between daily stock return (R)
and risk-free rate (Rf). We obtain daily stock price data between June 2012 and December 2013 from COMPUSTAT
SecurityDaily. EVENT takes a value of 1 on the day before, the day of, and the day after the event date. If an event takes
place on aweekend, the event date is adjusted to the next trading day. If two eventwindows overlap,wemerge the two
event windows by extending from the day prior to the first event to the day following the second event. NONEVENT
takes a value of 1 for the 3-daywindowaround the date onwhich a LIBORbankwas not accused ofmanipulationwhen
one or more LIBOR banks were accused. In other words, these nonevent LIBOR banks were not yet officially involved
in the scandal (i.e., public/press announcements) when other LIBOR banks were accused to have been involved. Both
EVENT and NONEVENT banks are defined ex post. If a bank has been an event bank (i.e., it had already exposed), it
belongs to neither the accused nor the nonaccused banks. In order to rule out the possibility that the negative stock
returns are industry wide instead of specific to LIBOR banks, we perform propensity scorematching (PSM) to identify
a group of non-LIBOR banks that are comparable to the LIBOR banks. We match on country and institution type (i.e.,
first two digits of Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] code) using a set of matching covariates including bank size
(SIZE), cost-to-income ratio (CIR), derivatives exposure (DETA), and loans-to-assets ratio (LTA). We implement nearest
neighbor matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) by selecting a control bank (without replacement) for each LIBOR
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TABLE 5 Top derivatives dealers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
EVENT −0.192** −0.191** −0.187** −0.187**
[−2.214] [−2.311] [−2.166] [−2.255]
NONEVENT −0.102 −0.109 −0.092 −0.099
[−1.130] [−1.209] [−1.048] [−1.133]
DEALER 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.016
[0.339] [0.349] [0.328] [0.338]
NONEVENT×DEALER −0.102* −0.101* −0.098* −0.097*
[−1.789] [−1.776] [−1.720] [−1.705]
NONLIBOR −0.091 −0.104 −0.081 −0.095
[−0.958] [−1.090] [−0.876] [−1.017]
SIZE 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
[0.229] [0.058] [0.251] [0.075]
DETA −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
[−0.493] [−0.647] [−0.499] [−0.652]
LTA −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.003***
[−2.825] [−2.869] [−2.775] [−2.819]
ADJFINE 0.265 0.345 0.253 0.333
[0.702] [0.912] [0.659] [0.866]
LTB −0.023 −0.023 0.044 0.043
[−0.448] [−0.443] [0.813] [0.775]
MKT 0.988*** 0.987*** 0.975*** 0.973***
[24.527] [24.512] [30.692] [30.758]
REIT −2.304 −1.897
[−0.742] [−0.603]
CORP −0.299*** −0.301***
[−3.207] [−3.238]
HY −0.119* −0.120*
[−1.867] [−1.888]
FOREX −12.365** −12.425**
[−2.117] [−2.118]
SOV −0.006** −0.006**
[−2.510] [−2.543]
COM 0.087*** 0.088***
[3.293] [3.307]
PLT −0.007 −0.007
[−0.337] [−0.329]
Constant −0.063 0.112 −0.058 0.119
[−0.270] [0.488] [−0.250] [0.520]
(Continues)
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
NONEVENT+NONEVENT×DEALER −0.204** −0.210** −0.190** −0.196**
[−2.370] [−2.440] [−2.270] [−2.340]
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country×Year No Yes No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
N 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448
R2 0.593 0.593 0.596 0.597
Note. This table reports test results for Hypothesis 2.DEALER is a dummy equals 1 if a bank is one of the 14 largest derivatives
dealers (G14). Coefficients for NONEVENT×DEALER suggest that the commonality of incentives to misbehave channels the
contagion effect of reputational penalties. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. All variables
are defined in the Appendix.
bank that has the closest propensity score. Table 1 reports the balancing property of the matching covariates: SIZE,
DETA, and LTA significantly differ between LIBOR and control banks. Since our objective here is to find the closest
bank for each LIBOR bank, we further control for these three covariates in our subsequent regressions to account for
the difference between the LIBOR and control banks.
NONLIBOR takes a value of 1 when a bank is not a LIBOR bank. ADJFINE is the fine settlement scaled by the pre-
settlement market capitalization.We also control for the following common risk factors that have explanatory power
on bank excess stock returns: interest rate risk (LTB), market risk (MKT), real estate risk (REIT), high-grade credit risk
(CORP), low-grade credit risk (HY), foreign exchange risk (FOREX), sovereign risk (SOV), commodity risk (COM), and
political risk (PLT). Detailed variable definition is reported in the Appendix.
We next corroborate our research hypothesis that deals with the contagion effect by estimating Model 2 that
includes an interaction term to test the role of incentive as a mechanism that channels contagion. Specifically, if com-
monality of the incentive to commit fraud channels the contagion, we should observe a stronger contagion effect
among themost active derivative dealers that have themost to gain from a potential manipulation of the LIBOR.
ERi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1EVENTi,t + 𝛽2NONEVENTi,t
+ 𝛽3DEALERi,t + 𝛽4NONEVENTi,t
× DEALERi,t + 𝛽5NONLIBORi,t + 𝛽6ADJFINEi,t
+ BANK CONTROLSi,t−1 + COMMON RISKt + 𝜀, (2)
where DEALER is a dummy that equals 1 for the 14 largest derivatives dealers, and 0 otherwise. This group of banks,
commonly referred to as the G14, could arguably gain the most from manipulating the LIBOR. This classification is
widely used in the business press and by organizations like the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The ISDA
Market Survey for Mid-Year 2010 pointed out that G14 banks held 82% of the total notional amount of derivatives
that were outstanding by mid 2010. In Model 2, the coefficient of interest, 𝛽4, tests whether the contagion effect is
stronger among large derivative dealers that have stronger incentive to misbehave. We expect a negative and signifi-
cant coefficient for𝛽4. This additional analysis is particularlywell suited toour research settingbecause the regulators’
probe highlights the key role of certain Barclays traders in the LIBOR scandal, who requested that certain Barclays
FABRIZI ET AL. 13
TABLE 6 First event effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
EVENT −0.188** −0.165* −0.185** −0.163*
[−2.318] [−1.987] [−2.258] [−1.941]
FIRST −0.068 −0.064 −0.013 −0.040
[−0.528] [−0.482] [−0.087] [−0.264]
EVENT×FIRST −1.003*** −1.142*** −0.936*** −1.079***
[−3.804] [−3.923] [−3.461] [−3.628]
NONEVENT −0.196** −0.338* −0.186** −0.325*
[−2.334] [−1.841] [−2.251] [−1.762]
NONLIBOR −0.113 2.841*** −0.105 3.218***
[−1.194] [3.038] [−1.133] [3.541]
SIZE 0.000 0.596*** 0.000 0.674***
[0.008] [3.485] [0.023] [4.080]
DETA −0.001 0.044*** −0.001 0.038***
[−0.661] [3.776] [−0.665] [3.233]
LTA −0.003*** −0.022 −0.003*** −0.022
[−2.873] [−1.182] [−2.823] [−1.100]
ADJFINE 0.440 0.491 0.417 0.485
[1.157] [1.235] [1.077] [1.196]
LTB −0.022 −0.022 0.043 0.040
[−0.413] [−0.417] [0.784] [0.709]
MKT 0.988*** 0.985*** 0.974*** 0.975***
[24.222] [24.224] [30.918] [31.261]
REIT −1.896 −2.353
[−0.596] [−0.736]
CORP −0.300*** −0.273***
[−3.256] [−2.855]
HY −0.118* −0.100
[−1.897] [−1.608]
FOREX −12.324** −11.084*
[−2.094] [−1.892]
SOV −0.006** −0.005*
[−2.380] [−1.960]
COM 0.088*** 0.083***
[3.271] [3.081]
PLT −0.007 −0.015
[−0.354] [−0.756]
Constant 0.137 −7.790*** 0.143 −8.894***
[0.588] [−3.107] [0.619] [−3.660]
(Continues)
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
EVENT+EVENT×FIRST −0.191*** −1.307*** −1.121*** −1.242***
[−3.790] [−3.870] [−3.540] [−3.640]
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country×Year No Yes No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
N 3,448 3,448 3,448 3,448
R2 0.593 0.596 0.597 0.599
Note. This table reports test results adjusting for the first event effect. FIRST is a dummy that equals 1 for the first event date
(i.e., June 27, 2012). Coefficients for the interaction term (EVENT×FIRST) indicate that reputational penalty is stronger for the
first event than for other events. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. All variables are defined in
the Appendix.
submitters submit LIBOR and EURIBOR rates that would benefit the traders’ trading positions, rather than rates that
complied with the definitions of LIBOR and EURIBOR.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
We describe our sample in the following ways. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for 3,448 daily observations. For
ease of presentation, the dependent variable (ER) is multiplied by 100. Appendix in Supporting Information S3 reports
the strength and direction of correlations between variables. The correlation statistics do not raise concerns regard-
ingmulticollinearity.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Initial emergence of the LIBOR scandal
Table 3 reports the significant events surrounding the initial emergence of the LIBOR scandal. On Thursday,March 24,
2011, Barclays emerged as a key focus of the investigation byU.K. andU.S. regulators. The following day (Day+1), Bar-
clays’ shareholders experienced a raw return of –0.31%,while the financial services industry’s capitalization-weighted
daily return in the United Kingdom was 0.96%. The capital market’s reaction to the initial emergence of the LIBOR
probe was weak, particularly compared to the reaction to the first LIBOR settlement on Wednesday, June 27, 2012,
whenBarclays admitted tomisconduct and reached fine settlementswith bothU.K. andU.S. regulators that amounted
to US$450million. Barclays’ shareholders experienced a raw return of –15.5%, equivalent to a £120.27million loss in
firm value, on the following day (Day +1), while the financial services industry’s capitalization-weighted daily return
in the United Kingdom was –0.64%. The difference between the two event dates suggests that the market did not
penalize the bank until the misconduct was affirmed with the financial penalty imposed. An alternative explanation is
that the financial penalty issued by the regulatorswas higher than themarket expected. The average raw return of the
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TABLE 7 Diminishing event effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
EVENT −0.318* −0.319* −0.326* −0.328*
[−1.870] [−1.881] [−1.942] [−1.959]
NONEVENT −0.249* −0.258* −0.230* −0.241*
[−1.817] [−1.895] [−1.734] [−1.823]
NONLIBOR −0.201 −0.213 −0.187 −0.200
[−1.553] [−1.644] [−1.489] [−1.594]
SIZE −0.008 −0.009 −0.008 −0.009
[−0.597] [−0.665] [−0.560] [−0.644]
DETA −0.005** −0.005** −0.004** −0.005**
[−2.491] [−2.591] [−2.425] [−2.543]
LTA −0.002** −0.002** −0.002** −0.002**
[−2.482] [−2.466] [−2.433] [−2.425]
ADJFINE 0.142 0.181 0.140 0.184
[0.353] [0.447] [0.354] [0.460]
LTB 0.009 0.009 0.057 0.057
[0.158] [0.156] [0.923] [0.910]
MKT 1.008*** 1.008*** 0.976*** 0.975***
[20.258] [20.221] [23.469] [23.395]
REIT 5.224 5.391*
[1.670] [1.707]
CORP −0.284*** −0.285***
[−3.232] [−3.235]
HY −0.182** −0.182**
[−2.196] [−2.193]
FOREX −12.749* −12.869*
[−1.927] [−1.928]
SOV −0.004* −0.004*
[−1.796] [−1.796]
COM 0.092*** 0.093***
[3.206] [3.210]
PLT −0.000 −0.000
[−0.009] [−0.018]
Constant 0.481** 0.601** 0.484** 0.613**
[2.118] [2.586] [2.165] [2.667]
Country FE Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No
Country×Year No Yes No Yes
(Continues)
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ER ER ER ER
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank
N 3,407 3,407 3,407 3,407
R2 0.600 0.601 0.603 0.604
Note. This table reports test results adjusting for diminishing event effect. Models are estimated using an weighted least
squares regression. Theweight is calculated as
1
event sequence
, which assigns earlier eventswith higherweights. Robust t-statistics
are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
remaining nonaccused LIBOR banks on June 28, 2012 (Day +1), was –0.42%, providing preliminary evidence for the
contagion effect of the penalty on Barclays’ misconduct.
5.2 Reputational penalties and the contagion effect
Table 4 reports the results from the test for H1 under different model specifications: reduced formmultifactor model
(columns1and2) andmultifactormodel controlling for additional common risk factors followingBessler andKurmann
(2014) (columns 3 and 4). We also include country and year fixed effects (columns 1 and 3), and country×year fixed
effects (columns 2 and 4).10 Standard errors, unless otherwise stated, are clustered at bank level (Petersen, 2009).
When interpreting the results in the table, note that the single-event results reflect an average return during the event
window. The overall sample’s abnormal return can be obtained by multiplying each of these reported figures (i.e., the
coefficients of EVENT,NONEVENT, andNONLIBOR) by the number of days in the event window (i.e., 3 days). Results in
Table 4 suggest that banks that either were accused of or admitted to misconduct experienced an average cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) ranging from –0.166% to –0.191% during the 3-day event window. The coefficients for EVENT
across all specifications are negative and statistically significant, indicating that banks accused of misconduct experi-
enced negative abnormal returns during the periods surrounding the announcement of alleged manipulation, which
supports H1. Nonevent banks, in turn, experienced an average CAR ranging from –0.180% to –0.344% during the 3-
day period. The coefficient forNONEVENT across all specifications are statistically significant and negative, suggesting
that the LIBOR banks that were not accused of misconduct experienced negative abnormal returns during the period
surrounding the announcement of manipulation, which we interpret as the contagion effect of the reputational dam-
age. The coefficients for NONLIBOR are not statistically significant, so the reputational penalties and the contagion
effect of the reputational penalties are specific to the LIBORbanks, whichmitigates the possibility that our results are
due to industry-wide shocks that occurred around the event dates. To further gauge the economic significance of our
results, we recast the coefficients in column 4 in U.S. dollars. Across all 3-day event windows, accused banks on aver-
age experienced a drop of US$196 million in market value, while for nonaccused banks, the market value on average
dropped by US$386million.
Our theoretical framework posits that contagion is channeled by the commonality of incentives and opportunity to
commit a fraudulent act. Consequently, we should expect that contagion is stronger among banks that have stronger
incentives and opportunities tomisbehave. Table 5 presents results from estimatingModel 2, in whichwe interact the
dummy variablesNONEVENTwithDEALER to determinewhether the contagion effect is stronger for large derivatives
dealers that have inherently greater incentive to commit the fraud. As expected, the coefficients for the interaction
10 We do not include bank fixed effects in our models because the structure of our data does not allow for such specification: We have few events for each
bank, and bank fixed effects would absorb a substantial part of the variation that we are interested in.
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TABLE 8 Alternative reputational penalty measures
Panel A. Abnormal returns
(1) (2)
AR AR
EVENT −0.166* −0.164*
[−2.008] [−2.014]
NONEVENT −0.155* −0.160*
[−1.887] [−1.947]
NONLIBOR −0.075 −0.084
[−0.800] [−0.899]
SIZE 0.002 0.001
[0.174] [0.064]
DETA −0.001 −0.002
[−0.635] [−0.751]
LTA −0.003*** −0.003***
[−2.720] [−2.751]
ADJFINE 0.291 0.355
[0.758] [0.971]
Constant 0.271 0.440*
[1.164] [1.888]
Country FE Yes No
Year FE Yes No
Country×Year No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank
N 3,448 3,448
R2 0.003 0.004
Panel B. Culmulative abnormal returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR[0] CAR[0] CAR[−1,+1] CAR[−1,+1] CAR[−2,+2] CAR[−2,+2]
EVENT −0.158** −0.162** −0.529*** −0.540*** −0.319** −0.329**
[−2.197] [−2.281] [−2.867] [−2.927] [−2.104] [−2.157]
NONEVENT −0.213*** −0.217*** −0.560*** −0.573*** −0.474*** −0.482***
[−3.244] [−3.284] [−3.250] [−3.364] [−3.019] [−3.040]
NONLIBOR −0.049 −0.051 −0.208 −0.217 −0.146 −0.152
[−0.687] [−0.725] [−1.007] [−1.055] [−0.727] [−0.753]
Constant 0.037 0.060 0.146* 0.241** −0.068 −0.054
[1.261] [1.552] [1.885] [2.528] [−1.084] [−0.633]
(Continues)
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
Panel B. Culmulative abnormal returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR[0] CAR[0] CAR[−1,+1] CAR[−1,+1] CAR[−2,+2] CAR[−2,+2]
Country FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country×Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
N 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184 4,184
R2 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.012
Note. This table reports test results using alternative reputational penalty measures. Panel A reports results based on the
use of abnormal returns as a proxy for reputational penalty. Panel B reports results using the reputational penalty measure
developed by Gillet et al. (2010) and Fiordelisi et al. (2014). Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the bank level.
All variables are defined in the Appendix.
terms are negative and statistically significant, providing support for the notion that the commonality of incentives to
misbehave channels the contagion effect. Thus, H2 is supported.
5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Diminishing event effect
One concern that may affect the robustness of our baseline results is associated with the fact that not all news may
be equal to each other, with earlier news beingmore important than later news.We address this concern in twoways:
testing the effect of the first event and accounting for the diminishing event effect by using a weighted least squares
regression. Many event studies focus on the first event date when examining the abnormal returns, as in most cases,
markets react predominantly strongwhen the first event takes place.We test this conjuncture by including an interac-
tion term, EVENT×FIRST, with FIRST being a dummy that equals 1 for the first event date (i.e., June 27, 2012). Results,
reported in Table 6, suggest that the reputational penalty is stronger for the first event11 than for other events, which
confirms thatmarkets incorporate new information once it becomes available.We further account for this diminishing
event effect by employing a weighted least squares regression. The weight is calculated as
1
event sequence
, which assigns
earlier events with higher weights. Results reported in Table 7 suggest that our results hold even when diminishing
event effect is accounted for.
5.3.2 Alternative reputational penalty measures
We next check the robustness of our results to the choice of reputational penalty measures. We first use abnormal
returns, calculated as the difference between a bank’s stock return and market return, as a proxy for reputational
penalty. Results reported in Panel A of Table 8 are consistent with our baseline results.
11 In a similar way, we also test the effect of events in the first week and first month, and find no significant coefficients for the interaction terms.
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We then followGillet et al. (2010) and Fiordelisi et al. (2014) tomeasure reputational penalty as follows:
ARi,0(Rep) = Ri,t − 𝛼i − 𝛽iRmt −
lossi,t
market capitalizationi,t
, (3)
whereRi,t is the stock returnof the accusedbank ionday t;𝛼i is the idiosyncratic risk component of stock i;𝛽i is thebeta
coefficient of stock i; and Rmt is the return on the banking industry on day t. The 𝛼i and 𝛽i coefficients are estimated
for each bank using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of Ri,t on Rmt for a 250-working-day estimationwindow
(from the 31st to the 280th day before the first announcement). lossi,t is the loss amount (i.e., fine settlement) suffered
by bank i at time t.market capitalizationi,t is themarket value of bank i’s shares at time t.
lossi,t
market capitalizationi,t
is equivalent
to ADJFINE defined in Section 4.2. We then calculate the CAR, CARi(𝜏1, 𝜏2), for each stock by adding all AR for each
time t in the event window [𝜏1, 𝜏2].
CARi(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =
𝜏2∑
t=𝜏1
ARi,t. (4)
Panel B of Table 8 reports results for different event windows using the alternative reputational penalty measure:
[0], [–1, +1], and [–2, +2]. Results remain unchanged across these event windows using this alternative reputational
penalty measure.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper documents reputational penalties and international bank contagion in the setting of a financial scandal,
investigating how organizational actions that are contrary to social norms lead to reputational damage for organiza-
tions that share incentives and opportunity to engage in wrongdoing with the offending organization, even if they do
not so engage. Specifically, we show that reputational penalties are imposed by the market to nonculpable firms that,
simply by sitting on the LIBOR panel, share with fraudulent companies the opportunity and the incentive to misbe-
have. The results on large derivative dealers demonstrate the ability of shared incentives and opportunities to channel
contagion to nonaffiliated firms. Therefore, it has been sufficient for the market to recognize a commonality of incen-
tives and opportunity to commit the fraud to channel reputational penalties from accused firms to nonaccused firms.
This paper is relevant to policymakerswho seek to influence banks’ risk-taking behavior. Solutions to unethical behav-
ior in banking and banking regulation in general require deep and far-ranging actions. Some countries have included
ethical guidelines in legislation while others have not. As bank ethics are still often voluntary, the task of disciplining
banks falls to market discipline and legal enforcement. Sound and ethical banking demands the joint effort of banks
in establishing ethical behavior as a foundation for the industry, the market and regulatory disciplines to guide and
supervise bank behavior, and an effective legal environment that provides contextual support for the function of these
two devices. Like all studies, ours is not without its limitations. Specifically, because we only have a limited amount
of events for each bank, we cannot use bank fixed effects models that would have alleviated concerns about omitted
variable bias. Results must be interpreted having this caveat in mind.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITION
Variable Definition Source
EVENT Dummy= 1 on the day before, the day of, and the day after the event date (i.e., [−1,
+1]) when a bankwas accused of LIBORmanipulation. If an event takes place on a
weekend, the event date is adjusted to the next trading day. If two event windows
overlap, wemerge the two event windows by extending from the day prior to the
first event to the day following the second event.
NONEVENT Dummy= 1when a bankwas a LIBOR bank andwas not accused of manipulation
when one ormore LIBOR banks were accused on the event date. In other words,
these nonevent LIBOR banks were not yet officially involved in the scandal (i.e.,
public/press announcements) when other LIBOR banks were accused to have been
involved.
NONLIBOR Dummy= 1when a bankwas not amember of the LIBOR panel.
DEALER Dummy= 1 if a bank is one of the 14 largest derivatives dealers (G14).
FIRST Dummy= 1 on the first event date (i.e., June 27, 2012) onwhich the LIBOR scandal
began.
R Daily stock return. COMPUSTAT
Rf Risk-free rate. 3-month national/regional treasury-bill rate. Datastream
ER Excess return. The difference between a bank’s stock return (R) and risk-free rate (Rf).
SIZE Bank size. Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets at fiscal year end. Bankscope
CIR Cost-to-income ratio. Operating expenses divided by the sum of net interest revenue
and other operating income.
Bankscope
DETA Derivatives exposure. Total fair value of financial derivatives divided by total assets. Bankscope
LTA Loans-to-assets ratio. Total loans divided by total assets. Bankscope
ADJFINE Adjusted fine. Fine settlement scaled by the presettlementmarket capitalization.
LTB Interest rate risk. Percentage changes in themarket value of long-term assets. The
factor is based onmarket prices of 10-year government bonds.
Datastream
MKT Market risk. Percentage changes in themarket value of the country’s banking sector
stockmarket portfolios.
Datastream
REIT Real estate risk. Percentage changes in themarket value of the country’s REIT
investments. The factor is provided by FTSE/NAREIT.
Datastream
CORP (High-grade) credit risk. Changes in the default premium between BBB- and
AAA-rated corporate bonds. The factor is based on time series maintained by
Merrill Lynch.
Datastream
HY (Low-grade) credit risk. Changes in the default premium between high-yield bonds
and corporate bonds. The factor is based on time series maintained byMerrill
Lynch.
Datastream
FOREX Foreign exchange risk. Percentage changes in the trade-weighted currency baskets
as provided by the Bank of England. The factor measures the currency value with
respect to the currency values of themajor trade partners.
Bank of England
SOV Sovereign risk. Changes in the difference of the (mean) of yields on the 7–10 years
government bonds (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy) and 7–10 years German
Government bonds.
Datastream
COM Commodity risk. Percentage changes in the S&PGSCI Total Return Index. Datastream
PLT Political risk. Percentage changes in gold price against U.S. dollars. Bank of England
